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Abstract
The interpretation of Marxist philosophy, as a part of 
Marxist studies, has been an important topic discussed by 
academics. Althusser’s interpretation mainly reflected in 
attempting to define the attribute of Marxist philosophy. 
For early Althusser, Marxist philosophy is “the theory 
of theoretical practice”; and for late Althusser, Marxist 
philosophy is the “class struggle in the field of theory”. 
This shift was closely related to his self-criticism since 
1967.
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INTRODUCTION
In the view of traditional Western Marxism, Karl 
Korsch, as a representative of Humanitarian Marxism, 
firstly put forward the issue of the relationship between 
Marxism and philosophy, namely “Korsch Problem”. 
By exploring this problem, he established the important 
role of philosophic perspective in Marxist theory for the 
study of Western Marxism. Althusser, a representative 
of Scientism Marxism, although emphasized the 
dimension of philosophy in Marxist theory as with 
Humanitarian Marxism, he still felt dissatisfied with the 
way of interpretation by the Humanitarian Marxism; 
although both belong to the “Western Marxism”, to some 
extent they disapproved the Soviet textbook system. 
Therefore, for Althusser, it is necessary to rebuild Marxist 
philosophy. His theoretic efforts are mainly reflected in 
the early and late interpretations of the attribute of Marxist 
philosophy.
1.   THE EARLY INTERPRETATION: 
M A R X I S T  P H I L O S O P H Y I S  “ T H E 
THEORY OF THEORTICAL PRACTICE”
In 1965, Althusser published his book named For Marx. 
In this book, mainly based on Marx’s early works, 
Althusser made an interpretation of Marxist philosophy. 
In “On the Young Marx”, he studied Marx’s early writings 
on political, theoretical and historical aspects, especially 
attached great importance to the theoretical problem, and 
made a detailed analysis of the relationship between Marx 
and Hegel. First of all, he put forward a political problem 
about Marx’s early work, namely, young Marx and late 
Marx who is the true Marx. Althusser firmly opposed 
including the philosophical dimension of Marxism into 
young Marx. Thus it can be seen that Althusser’s view 
of Marxist philosophy is just the opposite to the view of 
Humanism Marxism philosophy, which insists that Marx’s 
youth represents the real Marx. In order to illustrate the 
correctness of his theory, Althusser further presupposed 
the orthodox Marxists’ positions in the face of attack and 
then criticized them. Firstly, in his view, Marx’s youth is 
not a part of Marxism. Secondly, he further refined this 
political problem to text study, put forward the principle 
of analysis of Marx’s early works, namely theoretical 
problem. In his opinion, people tend to lack a historical 
analysis of the source of some ideas when reading Marx’s 
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works. Even though Marx used Hegel’s terms in his youth, 
one need to be aware of that different people using the 
term has different meanings. He opposed studying Marx’s 
early works from Hegel’s view, opposed emphasizing too 
much on the continuity of Marx and Hegel, for the latter 
at most can only lead to a theory of sources or a theory 
of anticipation. Althusser called this research method as 
“analytico-teleological theory”. In his view, this method 
breaks the integrity of Marxism philosophy, unfavorable 
to the unity of theory and practice. In other words, 
Althusser not only opposed the economic determinism, 
but also opposed too much emphasis on the reaction 
of the superstructure. For him, only do “symptomatic 
reading” of Marxism, through comparison study on 
problematics of Marx’s ideas and other ideas especially 
Hegel’s ideas, can reveal the new meaning of Marx’s 
thoughts. To this end, he put forward the three principles 
for studying young Marx’s ideas: a) emphasizing the 
integrality of Marxism; b) emphasizing the relationships 
among thoughts, ideology, social problems and social 
structure; c) emphasizing the role of intellectuals with 
their time in promoting the development of social thought. 
These are also the characteristics of Marxist philosophy in 
Althusser’s view. 
On the base of these analyses, Althusser illustrated 
the formula of the “retreat” in study of young Marx’s 
ideas, that is, revealing “the concrete man and the real 
history” (Althusser, 1969, p.71), in order to explain the 
emergence of Marx’s thought and its mutations. Through 
the analysis of the German ideology world, Althusser 
pointed out that Germany is more developed and deep 
in thought and theory, but the economy itself is not 
developed. The result is that the ideological advance 
development becomes a hindrance, and needs to retreat 
to a corresponding stage. That is to say, in Germany, the 
theory is higher than the real, and thus needs retreating 
to the reality. Therefore, Marx’s criticism of the German 
ideology, relative to the theory in Germany at that time, 
is not a kind of transcendence, instead is a step backward. 
In this sense, Althusser denied the legitimacy of Marx’s 
youth, mainly based on the discontinuity of Marx’s 
philosophy and Hegel’s philosophy. This view drawn 
criticism from others (especially John Lewis), therefore, 
Althusser proposed that it should reveal the “specific 
difference” which strictly distinguishes the Marxist 
dialectic from the Hegelian, and argued that it is of great 
significance for understanding the Marxist philosophy. 
After this discussion, Althusser provided a definition of 
the Marxist dialectic namely Marxist philosophy——
Marxist philosophy is “Theory of theoretical practice” 
(Althusser, 1969, p.171). In his view, Marxist philosophy 
had already existed in Marxist practice, so what we need 
to do is just to fill the gap between theory and practice. 
In other words, since the practice of Marxism had solved 
such problem, then what we get to do is to interpret it 
in theory. Because in a certain sense, finding a truth 
in practice doesn’t mean it has been fully understood. 
Nonetheless, why Althusser put forward this problem in 
theory? In his view, it can be answered by Lenin’s words 
“without theory, no revolutionary action”, that is to say, 
the theory can be utilized to guide the practice in reality. 
So, the task is tantamount to solve this problem which 
has existed in a practical state, as the solution to “what is 
Marxist philosophy”, that is, the definition of the attribute 
of Marxist philosophy.
It was starting from Marxist practice that Althusser 
explored the issues on the attribute of Marxist philosophy. 
In his view, “practice in general” means “any process 
of transformation of determinate given raw material 
into a determinate product, a transformation effected by 
a determinate human labour, using determinate means 
(of ‘production’)” (Althusser, 1969, p.166), which itself 
contains the “specific difference”, and different practices 
have different characteristics. For example, “social 
practice” contains a large number of distinct practices, 
such as production social practice, political practice, 
ideological practice and theoretical practice. As well 
as other practice, theoretical practice has its own raw 
material, means of production and product. So it aims at 
transforming the raw material (representations, concepts 
and facts) into the product (knowledge) by certain means, 
which is “a specific form of practice, itself belonging to 
the complex unity of the ‘social practice’ of a determinate 
human society” (Althusser, 1969, p.167). In Althusser’s 
opinion, theoretical practice in its most general form 
does not only include scientific theoretical practice, 
but also include pre-scientific theoretical practice, that 
is, ideological theoretical practice. And there is a strict 
distinction in the theoretical practice in its general form, 
characterized by “epistemological break”, that is, dividing 
Marx’s ideas into the ideological phase before 1845 and 
the science phase after 1845. That is to say, in Althusser’s 
view, there is a qualitative break in Marx’s thoughts. This 
conclusion is actually derived from his “symptomatic 
reading” of Marx’s writings.
After these analyses, Althusser put forward that “the 
Theory of practice in general” (Althusser, 1969, p.169) 
is the materialist dialectic. As Althusser himself said, the 
“Theory” here refers to Marxist philosophy. In this sense, 
for Althusser, Marxist philosophy, as a “Theory”, can 
be used to guide people’s practice. In other words, the 
“Theory of theoretical practice” can contribute to realizing 
the essence of general theory namely dialectics, in which 
is theoretically expressed the essence of theoretical 
practice in general, through it the essence of practice in 
general, and through it the essence of the transformations, 
of the development of things in general (Althusser, 1969, 
p.169). In addition, the “Theory of theoretical practice” 
also plays an important role in the areas without Marxist 
theoretical practice. Many problems in these areas have 
not been solved as it has in Capital, on the contrary, in 
large part need to be constituted by researchers, and then 
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become a truly theoretical practice, rather than technical 
practice. Therefore, these areas of epistemology, history 
of art, history of ideology, history of philosophy and 
so on, both need the guidance of Marxism. Moreover, 
any science is likely to be besieged by ideologies in 
the process of historical development, on pure science 
only can exist on condition that it continually frees itself 
from the ideology which occupies it. However, in this 
struggle, only Marxist philosophy, that is, “Theory of 
theoretical practice”, can provide the best method, and 
indicate direction for science; only Marxist philosophy 
can judge whether the disciplines like social psychology 
is science, and thus make a distinction between technical 
practice and historical practice. Therefore, in this sense, 
Marxist philosophy, as “the Theory of theoretical practice 
(as distinct from ideological practice)”, is “the Marxist 
dialectic in its specificity” (Althusser, 1969,  pp.171-172).
To emphasize the guidance of Marxist philosophy as a 
theory of practice, Althusser defined Marxist philosophy 
as “the Theory of theoretical practice”, in order to defend 
the scientificity of Marxist philosophy. But this definition 
was unilateral, which attracted criticisms from all sides. 
Therefore, Althusser reflected the formulation, and in the 
process, attempted to redefine the attribute of Marxist 
philosophy.
2.  SELF-CRITICISM: REFLECTIONS 
ON “THE THEORY OF THEORETICAL 
PRACTICE”
In 1967, in the Italian edition of Reading Capital, 
Althusser for the first time pointed out a theoretical 
tendency in his interpretation of Marxist philosophy. He 
said that the definition of Marxist philosophy as a theory 
of theoretical practice, which was given in For Marx and 
again Part One of Reading Capital is unilateral, and it is 
an error in the conception itself, and therefore inaccurate. 
“To define philosophy in a unilateral way as the Theory of 
theoretical practices (and in consequence as a Theory of 
the differences between the practices) is a formulation that 
could not help but induce either ‘speculative’ or ‘positivist’ 
theoretical effects and echoes.” (Althusser & Balibar, 
1970, p.8)
For Althusser, the theoretical tendency reflected in two 
aspects: First, ignoring combining the theory and practice 
in political practice, that is, not exploring the unification 
of Marxist theory and workers’ movements, while the 
latter occupied a very important position in the tradition 
of Marxism-Leninism. Second, no clearly revealing that 
what distinguishes Marxist philosophy from the other 
philosophy. In Althusser’s view, Marxist theory includes 
both science and philosophy. But he did not clearly 
reveal the difference between science and philosophy, not 
illustrate the link between philosophy and politics and its 
nature, and thus easily lead to “positivism”. 
In June 1972, in “Elements of Self-Criticism”, 
Althusser criticized again on the theoretical tendency in 
his early interpretation. He thought that the theoretical 
tendency mainly reflects in two concepts: one is the 
“epistemological break”, the other is the “theoretical 
practice”. He firstly criticized the theoretical explanation 
of the “break”, that is, “contrasting truth and error in the 
form of the speculative distinction between science and 
ideology, in the singular and in general. The contrast 
between Marxism and bourgeois ideology thus became 
simply a special case of this distinction. Reduction + 
interpretation: From this rationalist-speculative drama, the 
class struggle was practically absent” (Althusser, 1976, 
p.106). In other words, in Althusser’s view, his theoreticist 
explanation of the “break” reflected in contrasting science 
and ideology and thus distinguishing Marxism from 
bourgeois ideology. This is because the notion of ideology 
which appears in The German Ideology is very equivocal. 
It plays two different roles, “designating a philosophical 
category on the one hand (illusion, error), and a scientific 
concept on the other (formation of the superstructure)”. 
“Marx did after all overcome it”, but Althusser brought 
this equivocal notion of ideology into “play within the 
rationalist context of the antithesis between truth and 
error. And so ideology was reduced to error, and error 
called ideology, and this whole rationalist game was 
given a fraudulent Marxist appearance.” (Althusser, 1976, 
p.119) 
Then, Althusser criticized the definition of Marxist 
philosophy as “Theory of theoretical practice”, for it is 
“quite indefensible, and must be done away with. And 
it is not enough to suppress a formula: it is a question 
of rectifying, within their theoretical apparatus, all the 
effects and echoes of its reverberation. In the same way, 
the category of ‘theoretical practice’, which was very 
useful in another context, is nevertheless dangerous in its 
ambiguity, since it uses one and the same term to cover 
both scientific practice and philosophical practice, and 
thus induces the idea that philosophy can be (a) science: 
But in a context which does not cause the ambiguity to 
become speculative confusion, this category may still, 
on occasion, play a role, since it serves as a materialist 
reminder to ‘theory’ of practice.” (Althusser, 1976, 
p.147) Althusser tried to deny the definition of Marxist 
philosophy as “Theory of theoretical practice” by rejecting 
its general, rationalist-speculative form, and reworked 
it from another point of view. So he brought the notion 
“class conflict” to the definition of Marxist philosophy. 
As he said then, lacking class struggle and its effects in 
theory in his first essays on Marxist philosophy was the 
biggest mistake, “the class struggle does not figure in 
its own right in For Marx and Reading Capital; it only 
makes an appearance when I talk about the practical and 
social function of ideology; and of course (this is certainly 
the biggest mistake I made in my essays on Marxist 
philosophy)” (Althusser, 1976,  p.146).
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Therefore, Althusser in his late years made a revision 
of the definition “Theory of theoretical practice”. In 
the process, he made use of Mao Tse-Tung’s method of 
contradiction analysis. Because in his view, in order to 
correctly evaluate Marxist philosophy, starting out from 
Mao’s categories on contradiction is the only correct 
choice. 
Now Mao talks above all  about poli t ics,  even in his 
philosophical texts— and in this he is correct, more so than 
might be imagined—and he gives reasons for believing what 
Engels and Lenin suggested, which is the theoretical foundation 
of the Leninist “materialist reading” not only of Hegel, the 
absolute idealist, but of all philosophers without exception 
(including Engels, Lenin and Mao themselves): That in every 
philosophy, in every philosophical position, you must consider 
the tendency in its contradiction, and within this contradiction 
the principal tendency and the secondary tendency of the 
contradiction, and within each tendency the principal aspect, the 
secondary aspect, and so on.  (Althusser, 1976, p.145)
3 .   THE LATE INTERPRETATION: 
MARXIST PHILOSOPHY IN THE LAST 
INSTANCE IS “CLASS STRUGGLE IN 
THE FIELD OF THEORY”
Of course, in the process of reflection on “Theory of 
theoretical practice”, Althusser is also trying to redefine 
the attribute of Marxist philosophy. The attempt is firstly 
embodied in his essay “Philosophy as a Revolutionary 
Weapon”. In this essay, he discussed the relationship 
between philosophy and politics, put forward that 
“philosophy is fundamentally political” (Althusser, 1971, 
p.12). In his view, politics determined everything. But 
the “politics” he said here refers to Marxism-Leninism 
politics, not a general sense of politics. In addition, 
Althusser also explored the relationship between 
philosophy and science, thought that “philosophy is 
always linked to the sciences” (Althusser, 1971, p.15). 
In his view, Marxist theory includes both science and 
philosophy. After the continent of Mathematics opened 
by Thales and the continent of Physics opened by 
Galileo, Marx opened up a third continent to scientific 
knowledge, that is, the continent of Historical Science. 
This new continent induced a revolution in philosophy, 
which is called dialectical materialism. The emergence 
of philosophy is always accompanied by significant 
events, and therefore the philosophy always lags behind 
the science in Marxist theory. Through the definition of 
relationships between philosophy and politics, philosophy 
and science, Althusser clarified the relationship between 
the class struggle and Marxism-Leninism philosophy, 
pointed out that Marxist philosophy is “the proletarian 
class struggle in theory” (Althusser, 1971, p.19). This 
is the first time Althusser explicitly referring to “class 
struggle in theory”, but did not argue that in detail. Later, 
in “Lenin and philosophy” and other essays, Althusser 
reasserted the relationships among philosophy, science 
and politic. He said, “Philosophy is a certain continuation 
of politics, in a certain domain, vis-a-vis a certain reality. 
Philosophy represents politics in the domain of theory, or 
to be more precise: with the sciences— and, vice versa, 
philosophy represents scientificity in politics, with the 
classes engaged in the class struggle.” (Althusser, 1971, 
p.65) In Althusser’s view, “what is new in Marxism’s 
contribution to philosophy is a new practice of philosophy. 
Marxism is not a (new) philosophy of praxis, but a (new) 
practice of philosophy. ” “This new practice of philosophy 
can transform philosophy. And in addition it can to 
some extent assist in the transformation of the world.” 
(Althusser, 1971,  p.68)
In Althusser’s opinion, the theoretical error he made 
in the early interpretation consists in thinking that 
philosophy is a science, and that, like every science, it has 
an object, a beginning, and a history. So he began to “put 
things right”. In a philosophy course for scientists, dating 
from 1967, and then in Lenin and Philosophy (February 
1968), he put forward other propositions: 1. Philosophy is 
not (a) science. (b) Philosophy has no object, in the sense 
in which a science has an object. (c) Philosophy has no 
history, in the sense in which a science has a history. (d) 
Philosophy is politics in the field of theory (Althusser, 
1976, p.68). But he argued that proposing such a new 
definition of philosophy (politics in theory), of the system 
of “double, equal representation” at the level of the 
Sciences and of Politics philosophy is still a temporary 
solution, still part of the compromise. (Althusser, 1976, 
pp.149-150) Therefore, in “Elements of Self-Criticism”, 
he reasserted the role of social (political, ideological and 
scientific) practice in the field of philosophy. He said: 
The point that I wanted to bring home, and which seems to me, 
as things are, decisive for Marxism, is not only the “mixed-up” 
character of the theoretical and practical functions of philosophy, 
but the primacy of the practical function over the theoretical 
function in philosophy itself. It was to mark the decisive 
importance of this position (Thesis) and to clarify the primacy of 
the practical function that I put forward the thesis: “Philosophy 
is, in the last instance, class struggle in theory”. (Althusser, 
1976, p.143) 
In July 1972, in “Reply to John Lewis”, Althusser 
made a self-criticism of Lewis’s criticism and expressed 
his position. In this essay, starting from the reality after the 
founding of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), 
Althusser revealed the realistic difficulties and philosophy 
origin under the Stalinist model. In his view, for a long 
time Stalin denied the contradiction in socialist society, 
so he could not admit the possibility of the existence of 
exploitation in socialism. Therefore, 
he tended to displace the problems resulting from the 
contradictory development of class relations within the USSR 
onto the two forms of class struggle which he did recognize, 
thus explaining them as effects either of the international class 
struggle or of the struggle against the former exploiting classes. 
(Althusser, 1976, pp.13-14) 
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Althusser further pointed out that Stalin wanted 
to explain everything by economic infrastructure 
alone, forgetting about the role of the superstructure 
in the reproduction of production relations, so he fell 
into economism. But to forget about the role of the 
superstructure is also to forget how the superstructure 
operates, 
it operates through apparatuses which maintain the domination 
of the ruling class, but at the cost of continuously reproducing 
class struggle. To fall into economism is therefore also to 
forget about class struggle and to forget about class struggle is 
humanism. (Althusser, 1976, p.14) 
That is to say, in Stalin view, the way toward 
communism is through the development of productive 
forces, rather than through the class struggle, so he fell 
into both economism and humanism. 
It was exactly from the criticism of Stalin, Althusser 
once again proved that Marxist philosophy is “class 
struggle in the field of theory”. He said, “it has also been 
made by Gramsci and by Mao: the working class needs 
philosophy in the class struggle. It needs not only the 
Marxist science of history (historical materialism), but 
also Marxist philosophy (dialectical materialism). Why?” 
“I should like to reply by using a formula. I will take the 
(personal) risk of putting it this way: the reason is that 
philosophy is, in the last instance, class struggle in the 
field of theory.” (Althusser, 1976, p.37) Here, Althusser 
added the qualifier “in the last instance” to “class struggle 
in the field of theory”, “in order to be able to give both 
the class struggle (the last instance) and the other social 
practices (among them scientific practice) their due in 
their ‘relation’ to philosophy.” (Althusser, 1976, p.150)
As Althusser said, Engels and Lenin had repeatedly 
mentioned that there were three forms of class struggle: 
economic form, political form and theoretical form. 
Althusser further pointed out, on the one hand, “when 
it is fought out in the theoretical field, the concentrated 
class struggle is called philosophy” (Althusser, 1976, 
p.38). But, on the other hand, Marxist philosophy as 
the “class struggle in the field of theory”, can not be 
simply summed up in class struggle and politics. Because 
philosophy has its own particularity, and it is only the 
theoretical expression of class struggle in the field of 
theory. Besides that, it also needs a premise, namely a 
factor: science, which can be represented. Thus, Althusser 
revealed the relationships among the philosophy, politic 
and science. In his view, if philosophy is the class 
struggle in theory, if it is determined by politics, it will 
have a political effect in specific political practice. But if 
regarding philosophy as the class struggle in the field of 
theory, it will have the effect both in the fields of science 
and ideology, and thus effect on the combination of theory 
and practice, including understanding and realizing the 
combination. “It therefore has effects, of course, not only 
in political practice and scientific practice, but also in 
every social practice, from the ‘struggle for production’ 
(Mao) to art, etc.” (Althusser, 1976,  p.58).
Therefore, by comparing Lewis’s argument with 
thesis of Marxism-Leninism, Althusser revealed how the 
philosophy operates. In his view, philosophy operates 
either in a forward manner or in a backward manner. For 
the former, it helps to produce new scientific knowledge, 
while for the latter, it tries to cut these advances, pulling 
human back to the era in which science did not exist. 
“Strictly speaking, we should say that it tends to act in 
one way or another—for every philosophy is always 
contradictory.” (Althusser, 1976, p.61) That is to say, 
though philosophical practice plays an important role 
in many respects as well as Lenin’s political practice, 
it operates in a characteristic way—philosophical way, 
which is different from the way political practice operates. 
At this point, Althusser illustrated his new definition on 
the attribute of Marxist philosophy, which is in the last 
instance, class struggle in the field of theory. 
CONCLUSION
To sum up, Althusser’s definition on the attribute of 
Marxist philosophy has a shift closely related to his self-
criticism since 1967. He thought that class struggle and its 
influence in theory are what he mainly ignored in his early 
work. If realizing this, one can replace some categories 
as starting point in the correct position. So through giving 
both the class struggle and the other social practices 
their due in their relation to philosophy, Althusser made 
a new definition on the attribute of Marxist philosophy, 
and thus, to a certain extent, realized the intervention 
to humanitarian interpretation of Marxist philosophy, 
achieved the expected effect of the theory. But in fact, 
due to the pressure of social and political environment, 
Althusser must wring a life between the cracks of 
humanitarian and dogmatism, and thus made his theory 
come to a concession to the interpretation by Soviet 
textbook system or the interpretation by Humanitarian 
in different periods. Therefore, in this sense, it can be 
said that the attribute of Marxist philosophy interpreted 
by Althusser is a theoretical interference between the 
interpretations by Humanitarian and the Soviet textbook 
system.
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